Spain and the European Union-Russia Conflict : the impact of the sanctions by Sánchez Andrés, Antonio & De Pedro, Nicolás
notes internacionals CIDOB 108 . FEBRUARY 2015 1
R elations between the European Union and Russia areat the 
lowest point in their history. 
Some Russian analysts even 
warn that we are approach-
ing the point of breakdown. 
Moscow is attempting to 
impede the tightening of the 
sanctions and, at the same 
time, destroy the fragile—
although for the moment 
holding—European unity 
on the subject. This unity is 
inseparable from the lead-
ership of the German chan-
cellor, Angela Merkel, and 
rests upon deep divisions 
between the member states. 
Spain is widely seen to be 
one of most sympathetic 
countries to Moscow (along 
with Greece, Italy, Hungary 
and Bulgaria) and is one of 
the most openly reluctant 
to taking a hard line with 
Russia. This Spanish policy 
produces irritation and in-
comprehension in other Eu-
ropean societies, particularly 
among Russia’s neighbours. 
Madrid’s position seems to 
swing between a desire to 
prompt dialogue with Mos-
cow and a fear of appearing 
to be a belligerent partner, or 
one who obstructs the com-
mon EU position. 
The roots of the Spanish po-
sition towards Russia lie in a 
degree of historical inertia and 
are the result of a combination 
of political and economic con-
siderations. The perception 
of distance between the two 
countries and the absence of 
elements of genuine strate-
gic weight at stake for Spain 
play a crucial role in shaping 
Madrid’s point of view. Rus-
sia, for example, is one of the 
main suppliers of oil to Spain 
(14% of the total in 2013), but 
the supply sources of crude 
are highly diversified and, at 
the same time, Russian gas is 
not consumed in the Iberian 
peninsula. Political and diplo-
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Political and diplomatic relations are fluid, but they are neither special 
nor truly strategic for either of the two countries. In fact, Spain does no 
appear to receive any significant benefit from its position. 
Until now, the impact of the EU-Russia sanctions on Spain has been mo-
derate and highly concentrated in the agricultural sector. However, the 
consolidation and extension of the sanctions could have significantly ne-
gative effects, particularly in the fields of energy, railways and advanced 
technologies.
Since the beginning of the last decade, Spanish exports to Russia grew 
continually until a peak value of €2.84bn in 2008.
Though Russian tourism only accounts for 2.7% of total arrivals to 
Spain, the government sees it as a priority market with high expectations 
for the future. 
Russian investment in Spain is fairly residual and the greater part is 
directed to the attention of those Russians temporarily or permanently 
located in Spain. 
In its official narrative, Spain gives strategic character to its relations 
with Russia but there is an evident asymmetry in the degree of importan-
ce given to the relationship by one side and the other. 
The harmony between Madrid and Moscow materialises, for example, 
in the defence by Spanish diplomacy of the idea that Russia has “legi-
timate interests” in Ukraine. As a result, these “Russian interests” must 
be considered in any attempt to resolve the Ukrainian conflict sponsored 
by the EU.
Spain has shown very little enthusiasm for the adoption of sanctions 
against Russia but does not want to appear to be a European partner that 
makes a habit of blocking consensus decisions. 
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matic relations are fluid, but they are neither special nor truly 
strategic for either of the two beyond the official rhetoric. In 
fact, Spain does not seem to receive any significant benefit 
from this position. Both the ministry of foreign affairs and 
the Spanish business community agree that Moscow neither 
facilitates access to the Russian market nor gives particular 
political backing to Madrid. 
Bilateral economic relations, although promising in some 
sectors, are not particularly strong. But they nevertheless oc-
cupy a privileged place on the Spanish agenda, in line with 
the unquestionable primacy Mariano Rajoy’s government 
gives to economic and commercial activities in its foreign 
policy. Until now, the impact of the EU-Russia sanctions on 
Spain has been moderate and highly concentrated in the ag-
ricultural sector. However, the consolidation and extension 
of the sanctions could have significantly negative effects, 
particularly in the fields of energy, railways and advanced 
technologies. Perhaps the business that will be most heavily 
affected is Repsol, but it may also mean that the first steps 
taken by Indra are blocked off. In this field of discussion, the 
impact of the sanctions must be evaluated not only in terms 
of the resources invested so far, but also in terms of the conse-
quences of a market that is so costly to enter being closed off 
and all the efforts made up to now being lost. For this reason, 
the companies that are not affected—principally the large 
companies of the energy and infrastructure sectors—fear a 
possible fourth package of sanctions, and mean it is likely 
that Madrid will resolutely oppose any attempt to impose 
further punitive measures.
The economic dimension: the impact of the 
sanctions in Spain 
The Russian countermeasures in response to the EU sanc-
tions may mean losses of some €550 million annually to ag-
ricultural producers, which are likely to increase due to the 
future closure of the market. 
Commercial impact 
Since the beginning of the last decade, Spanish exports to 
Russia grew continually until a peak value of €2.84bn in 
2008. As a consequence of the crisis, exports declined sharply 
but grew again between 2008 and 2012 when sales to Rus-
sia totalled €2.95bn, exceeding the high point reached in 
2008. Nevertheless, in 2013 sales to Russia fell to €2.82bn. 
The contraction in Spanish sales to Russia in the past year 
can be explained by the restrictions on imports introduced 
by Moscow in 2013 affecting meat, fish and dairy products, 
for which health reasons were given as justification. In fact, if 
the level of exports of this type of product in 2013 had stayed 
at the same level as before, the total volume of Spanish sales 
would have grown. 
In order to appreciate the impact of the Russian countersanc-
tions, the export pattern up to August 2014 may be analysed 
(existing up-to-date information) and compared with previ-
ous years. The most striking case corresponds to the consign-
ments of animals and meat that by 2013 had already fallen to 
half the level of the previous year (€125.8 million) and which 
in 2014 were practically liquidated and recorded a volume of 
just €9.2 million.
In the case of vegetable products, which were also affected 
by the countersanctions, when the first eight months of the 
years are compared a continuous contraction since 2012 is 
observed. Nevertheless, the reduction in 2013 is attribut-
able to other circumstances. In fact, the evolution of Span-
ish exports of vegetable products in the March-May quar-
ter (prior to any effect of the countersanctions) shows a fall 
from 2012 levels to €48.4 million, rising again in 2014 to 
€61 million. Notwithstanding this, if we take the last quar-
ter for which we have information (June-August: a period 
in which the impact of the counter-sanctions was already 
being felt) the decline is continuous. In fact, while in 2013 
exports with a value of €64.7 million were made, in 2014 
the figure fell to €52.8 million. Since the counter-sanctions 
came into play in summer 2014 the expectation is that the 
change effected will be similar to that of the meat and ani-
mal products.
The countersanctions give us a glimpse of how, as a collateral 
effect, the restrictive measures applied in 2013 will be con-
solidated. In this sense if we consider that the level of exports 
of meat and vegetable products in 2012 (before the trade re-
strictions were introduced by Russia) was more than €550 
million (that is to say, close 
to 20% of Spanish exports to 
Russia), and if we consider 
that this was a level that was 
reproducible over the com-
ing years, then an estimate 
may be made of the losses to 
the Spanish economy. In addition, this figure is compounded 
by the extent to which the loss of a growth in sales to this 
market is considered definitive.
Impact on services: tourism
One of the relevant parts of Spain-Russia relations is tour-
ism, in particular, that of Russians visiting Spain. In the sec-
ond half of the last decade a tendency towards growth was 
consolidated in the trips made by Russian tourists to Spain, 
peaking in 2008 at more than a million tourists. In 2009 the 
crisis meant a decrease in that figure, but, from then on, the 
growth has been more than notable: in 2012 it went past the 
1.2 million mark and in 2013 it reached nearly 1.6 million 
Russian tourists. In the past year, tourists from Russia have 
been the national group that that has grown the most, with 
the number quadrupling since 2009. In addition, their level 
of expenditure is considered to be fairly high and exceeded 
€2.2bn in 2013. Though Russian tourism only accounts for 
2.7% of the total arrivals to Spain, the government sees it as 
a priority market with high expectations for the future, and 
it is considered as such in the National and Integral Tourism 
Plan 2012-2015.
Spain is widely seen to be one of most sympathetic 
countries to Moscow and is one of the most openly 
reluctant to taking a hard line with Russia
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However, this past year the Russian market has shown signs 
of stagnation and it is predicted that the number of Russian 
tourists in 2014 will be lower than that recorded in 2013 with 
the clear possibility that this decline will be consolidated in 
the future. This result is explained by two linked factors de-
riving from the economic crisis that began to reveal itself last 
year. First, there is the reduction in economic growth, and, 
second, the weak rouble has caused a trend towards depre-
ciation. This last factor may have been accentuated by the 
North American and European sanctions. These circumstanc-
es have restricted the income of Russian people, dampening 
their desire to travel to, among other places, Spain.
The fall in Russian tourist numbers is partly explained by the 
annexation of Crimea. This new Russian territory is a signifi-
cant tourist hub that became fashionable and was popularised 
among Russians last summer, but its capacity to overshadow 
Spain is more than questionable, for the time being at least. 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of a depreciated rouble could 
establish Crimea and, in general, the whole Russian Black Sea 
coast as a competitor to Spanish tourist destinations.
Impact on investment flows: from Russia to Spain
Russian investment in Spain is fairly residual. While in the 
three-year period 2008-2010 it amounted to €31.5 million, 
in 2012-13 it grew to €114.2 million. Among the sectors that 
have attracted the most resources are real-estate, hotels and 
catering. Also important are investments in commercial ac-
tivities, those related to the purchase of vehicles, and those 
related to tourism. That is to say, the greater part of Russian 
investment in Spain is directed to the attention of those Rus-
sians temporarily or perma-
nently located in Spain. In 
this respect, activities related 
to the real-estate sector to 
facilitate the sale of Spanish 
properties to Russian citizens stand out. In this sense, it is 
worth pointing out that in 2012 Russians were the second 
largest purchasers of houses in Spain after the English.
As an initial estimate, it might be predicted that the sanctions 
would have a reduced impact on property investment as they 
are highly decentralised and their point of reference is a com-
munity that already has a direct connection to Spain. Neverthe-
less, the possibility exists that the sanctions could produce un-
certainty or a loss of confidence about the situation of properties 
bought by Russian citizens in Spain because of increased con-
trols and the apparent possibility that restrictions on movement 
or investment will be extended to all Russian citizens and not 
only to a few leaders, as has been the case until now. This situ-
ation, along with the devaluation of the rouble would lead to a 
reduction in the volume of this kind of investment in Spain.
Impact on investment flows: from Spain to Russia
Spanish investment is greater in volume than that coming in 
the other direction, but it is still not particularly large. From 
2008-10, this investment amounted to €528.4 million but fell 
over the next three-year period to €218.2 million. Spanish in-
vestment is concentrated in the sectors of metal products and 
in the manufacture and sale of vehicles. In the past three years 
some significant investment has been made in the chemical 
sector and, in certain cases, investments have been made in 
the finance sector. In these cases, it is also unlikely that the 
sanctions will have a particularly negative effect and it does 
not appear that the Russian government will adopt special 
measures (countersanctions) that will harm them.
Spain-Russia corporate collaborations
One of the most significant collaborations between Russia 
and Spain is in the energy sector, which has, in the end, been 
included as part of the EU sanctions on Russia. Above all, the 
activities of Repsol stand out. The company arrived in Rus-
sia in 2006 when it acquired part of West Siberian Resources. 
Later, in 2011, it signed a cooperation agreement with Alli-
ance Oil Company to create a joint venture company, AROG, 
in the field of oil exploration and extraction. In productive 
terms, Repsol has rights in 27 blocks, of which 13 are in the 
exploration phase and 14 are in development. As a result of 
its activity in 2013 it managed to produce 14,600 equivalent 
barrels of oil a day, rising by mid-2014 to 17,640 barrels.
The company Técnicas Reunidas, for its part, already has 
level of experience in working in the Russian market. In 
2006, in particular, it contributed to the engineering works 
for the reconstruction of an oil refinery in the far-east of Rus-
sia (Khabarovsk). In 2013, Técnicas Reunidas won a contract 
worth €1.1bn from Lukoil to carry out the design of the con-
struction of an oil refinery in Volgograd. Iberdrola also has 
experience in the Russian market. In 2011 it delivered a turn-
key combined-cycle gas power plant in the Urals. This in-
volved the use of new technologies in adverse climatic condi-
tions. That same year it won a tender for the construction of 
an electrical sub-station, also in the Urals, to be delivered this 
year. Depending on the interpretation of the sanctions, their 
coming into effect could hinder the activities of the Spanish 
companies mentioned and, further, roll back their expansion 
into this market that has great prospects for the future and 
presents serious difficulties to those attempting to enter it.
Another significant productive area is that of capital goods. 
In 2013, the Russian government made its interest in building 
a high speed train network known. In this case, Talgo found 
itself well-positioned and in 2011, along with Adif, it won a 
contract to manufacture 6 trains of 20 carriages each. OHL 
had also won a contract in the railways field. Nevertheless, 
the economic crisis in Russia, the sanctions, and the desire of 
the Russian authorities to carry out an import substitution 
as a reaction to the sanctions imposed, could limit Spanish 
expectations for growth in this kind of business in Russia.
Special mention should also be given to the case of Indra, 
who had established a collaboration agreement with Rostej 
to develop joint projects in the field of advanced technolo-
gies. However, as the Russian company has fallen under the 
sanctions as it includes companies in the defence field, the 
prospects for the future in this line of production are in ques-
Bilateral economic relations, although promising in some 
sectors, are not particularly strong
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gratulated themselves on what they saw as an exercise of 
political and diplomatic coherence. 
Nevertheless, at times, this closeness has caused a degree 
of irritation with Spain among her Euro-Atlantic partners. 
A particular example was the meeting in Madrid between 
ministers García-Margallo and Lavrov on March 5th, 2014, 
with the conflict in escalation due to the deployment of Rus-
sian troops at strategic points on the Crimean peninsula. In 
the joint press conference, the Spanish minister for foreign 
affairs emphasized the importance of the respect for the law 
as a first principle (implying the recognition of Ukrainian 
territorial integrity) while also underlining that “the current 
difficulties began when president Yanukovich decided not to 
sign the association agreement with the EU, an association 
agreement that was erroneously presented as an exclusive 
and exclusionary alternative to the Eurasian Customs Union 
that Russia and other countries have put in place.” 
Crimea is, from the Spanish perspective, the most problem-
atic issue of all. But, in a similar way to Kosovo, the Spanish 
position is shaped by its tendency to internationally project 
its domestic concerns about Catalonia and the Basque coun-
try. García-Margallo himself, prior to the referendum held in 
Crimea in March 2014, did not hesitate to say that the parallel 
between Catalonia and Crimea was “absolute” and affirm, 
with his mind undoubtedly focussed on the Catalan issue, 
that “a referendum that violates an internal constitution by 
definition violates interna-
tional law and cannot have 
legal effect... a territory that 
breaks away in flagrant vio-
lation of an internal constitu-
tion cannot aspire to interna-
tional recognition”. 
This hard line on Crimea has not prevented Spain from sys-
tematically appealing for the EU to reopen dialogue with 
Russia. This implies, from the Spanish perspective, the need 
to find a legal solution to unblock the situation. It is in this 
line that we should understand the proposal made by the 
Spanish minister to his European colleagues on January 10th 
to resolve the issue of the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 
the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In the words 
of García-Margallo “if the conflict needs thawing, and the 
most difficult conflict is Crimea, let us seek an imaginative 
solution that allows both parties to save face”. 
Spain has shown very little enthusiasm for the adoption of 
sanctions against Russia. In large part this is for economic 
reasons. Current economic relations with Russia, as has been 
pointed out, are modest. In 2013, Spanish exports brought 
in a total of €234bn: of those only €2.8bn came from Rus-
sia, putting the country in 19th place on the list of import-
ers. Direct investment from Russia to Spain is minimal, and 
that by Spain into Russia is low at only €218 million in 2013. 
Nevertheless, after years of effort by Spain, the relationship 
is beginning to take off. And what is more, the Spanish gov-
ernment considers Russia to be a key partner in the tourism 
and property sectors that are so fundamental to Spain’s eco-
nomic recovery. Considering this, the crisis in Ukraine could 
not have come at a worse time. 
tion. Also in the field of advanced technologies is the Span-
ish company Fluidmechanica, which makes equipment for 
use in icebreaker boats. The company has been collaborating 
with Russia for 15 years and, if, for the moment, its activity 
does not fall under sanctions because of its strictly civil char-
acter, it could be harmed if the sanctions are widened. 
Political dimension: seeking a balance between 
Berlin and Moscow? 
In its official narrative, Spain gives strategic character to its 
relations with Russia. The framework document in this area 
is the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in March 2009 
by Prime Minister J.L. Rodríguez Zapatero and President D. 
Medvedev. This agreement has been followed by other diplo-
matic milestones such as the celebration of the Spain-Russia 
Dual Year in 2011 and the Dual Year of Spanish Language 
and Literature in Russia and of Russian Language and Liter-
ature in Spain in 2015. In 2016, the holding of a bilateral year 
of tourism is also planned. This series of initiatives tells the 
story of the fluidity of the relations and harmony between 
Madrid and Moscow. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the link is not genuinely strategic and there is an evident 
asymmetry in the degree of importance given to the relation-
ship by one side and the other. Seen from Moscow, Spain is a 
potential ally in a broader strategy of relations with the EU, 
but one which has little importance of its own.
Traditionally, Spain has shown either scant interest in east-
ern Europe or a degree of suspicion that the expansion of 
the EU towards the east would reduce European interest 
and aid to the southern border and the Mediterranean as 
a whole. Also, as with other European partners, Madrid’s 
focus on the former-Soviet space (excluding the very par-
ticular case of Kazakhstan) has been to favour relations 
with Russia (“Russia first”). Furthermore, the institutional 
inertia shaped by geographical distance, the good image 
that both countries have of each other—frequently based 
on cliché—and the absence of historical conflicts with Rus-
sia should be remembered. This historical legacy has given 
shape to the dominant perceptions of the Spanish politi-
cians, diplomats and military, whatever the colour of the 
government in power.
The harmony between Madrid and Moscow materialises, for 
example, in the defence by Spanish diplomacy of the idea 
that Russia has “legitimate interests” in Ukraine. And that, 
as a result, these “Russian interests” must be considered in 
any attempt to resolve the Ukrainian conflict sponsored by 
the EU. In this sense, it is no surprise that the official Spanish 
reaction to Euromaidan was, at best, half-hearted. In the eyes 
of Spanish diplomacy, the transformation of the Ukrainian 
crisis into an armed conflict in the east of the country only 
serves to confirm the appropriateness of its initial prudence 
and, in private conversations, senior Spanish officials con-
The Russian countermeasures in response to the EU 
sanctions may mean losses of some €550 million annually 
to agricultural producers
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Madrid has combined reluctance to take a hard line with 
Moscow with a desire not to show itself to be a European 
partner that makes a habit of blocking consensus decisions 
and much less when they are the clear result of initiatives 
led by Germany. In this sense, in order to try to mitigate the 
suspicions of certain European partners with regard to the 
Spanish position, García-Margallo has been due since May 
2014 to visit Kiev as a sign of the Spanish commitment to 
Ukraine following its presidential elections. The visit, post-
poned for several reasons, was finally made on the 10th of 
February 2015.
Until now, the three sanctions packages imposed on Rus-
sia by the EU and the Russian countermeasures have had 
limited impact in Spain. As noted above, the losses may be 
estimated at around €550 million annually. The main preoc-
cupation of the Spanish government is the concentration of 
this impact in the agriculture and livestock sectors of three 
regions: Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia. Wine and olive oil 
have been kept out of the veto on European foodstuffs im-
posed by the Russian Federation. This has been interpreted, 
in certain places, as a concession by Moscow to the coun-
tries of southern Europe—Spain, Italy and Greece—that are 
the largest exporters of these products and are traditionally 
receptive to Russian positions. Nevertheless, it must also be 
seen as proof of how difficult it is to replace those two prod-
ucts, given that the importation of Moldovan and Georgian 
wines are also subject to restrictions in Russia.
A striking aspect is that, for 
the first time, a developed 
crisis in eastern Europe has 
provoked intense debate 
and polarised public opinion 
in Spain. The Popular Party 
(PP), the Socialist Party (PSOE) and Convergence and Un-
ion (CiU) and their representatives in the European parlia-
ment, in particular, have aligned themselves with Europe’s 
more critical opinions on the Russian military intervention in 
Ukraine. However, United Left (IU) and Podemos have taken 
the Russian narrative on the Ukrainian conflict as their own, 
particularly with reference to the “fascist junta in Kiev” and 
the “anti-fascist” nature of “the war in the Dombas”. Their 
extremely critical position on the role of the EU and their in-
sistence on the need to uncouple from the USA and promote 
global rapprochement with Russia makes a pro-Russia turn 
in Spanish foreign policy probable if Podemos does lead a 
government. It is just one more of the crucial unknowns to be 
resolved in this electoral year in Spain. 
In 2014 tourists from Russia have been the national 
group that that has grown the most and their level of 
expenditure is considered to be fairly high
